ABSTRACT. Vaccination and the enforcement of stipulations of personal hygiene can be viewed as different mechanisms of colonial government. Immunization campaigns reach and register populations, but they may also appear to obviate the need for behavioral reform. Hygiene education implies the development of a disciplined, self-governing citizenry, although in the colonial setting validation of such attainment is usually deferred. This article explores the tension between mechanisms of security (immunization) and drill (hygiene) in the Philippines, under the United States' colonial regime, in the early twentieth century.
N Colonizing the Body, David Arnold called the introduction of mass vaccination against smallpox during the late nineteenth century a "remarkable demonstration of the interventionist ambitions and capabilities of western medicine in India." And yet, despite the obvious efficacy and cheapness of vaccination, a general feeling emerged that "vaccination was a distinctive form of medical activity that did not provide a suitable base or blueprint for the wider development of state medicine and public health." In the 1870s, efforts in British India to merge vaccination departments with the newly established sanitary departments failed, in part because vaccinators were deemed ignorant of sanitation. Arnold thus points to a paradox: vaccination, whether as symbol or act, epitomized the interventionist 
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ambitions of the colonial state, even as that same state increasingly displayed an "ambivalent or hesitant attitude" toward it. 1 In this article I intend to explore some of the tensions that can develop between intervention and government, ambiguities that are also expressed in the differences between vaccination and hygiene, or safeguard and discipline.
Arnold blames technical difficulties and widespread fears of a political backlash for the reticence of the British colonial state to vaccinate widely. No doubt such concerns would make even the most aggressive health officer think twice before urging compulsion. But we should also consider the rising interest in the reform of personal and domestic hygiene that accompanies disinclination toward mass vaccination. That is, we should recognize that the more effectively vaccination appears to protect from disease, the fewer opportunities might be offered to discipline a population. When a modern colonial state attempts to frame civic identities through rituals of disease avoidance, vaccination can provide an exemption-admittedly partial-from the consequences of disobeying the laws of hygiene. If a vaccine were available for typhoid, why would a disciplinary state, bent on reforming local customs and habits, want to make use of it? Take for example the American colonial state in the Philippines during the early twentieth century. American health officers dedicated themselves to altering local diet, toilet practices, housing, and clothing; they enjoined native inhabitants to treat their bodies and their excreta with caution; contact increasingly implied risk. The new tropical hygiene was predicated on limiting the transmission through local human and insect populations of recently identified microbial pathogens. 2 In the circumstances, then, automatic biological protection against disease might have allowed locals to outmaneuver a "civilizing" process based on disease avoidance. A vaccine, of questionable efficacy, was indeed available against typhoid for most of this period; but until the 1920s it was used only for troops. 3 The Philippines under the "progressive" and interventionist American regime thus serves as another example of state reticence to vaccinate civilians, but not for the reasons commonly adduced in histories of colonial public health. The emerging pattern of typhoid vaccination in the early years of the twentieth century is especially revealing. A large-scale program of British troop inoculation in the Boer War (1899-1902) appeared to reduce the incidence of enteric fever among the vaccinated, but the statistical analysis was flawed and contestable. It was also evident that the vaccinated suffered severe side effects. In 1904, the British army suspended the routine inoculation of troops heading for South Africa and India and emphasized instead sanitary precautions against the disease. But anti-typhoid immunization gradually became more acceptable. In 1906 an improved version of typhoid vaccine was reintroduced for soldiers in India; and inoculation became compulsory for all members of the Indian Civil Service in 1912, though its use among civilians remained limited. During World War I, more than 90% of the volunteer British force in France was immunized, though anti-vaccinationists and liberal politicians ensured that it never became compulsory. 4 By 1911, all American troops were compelled to submit to typhoid inoculation. The pattern becomes clear: biological protection where possible for state officers and military personnel, with intensive hygiene reform of civilians or natives.
Yet it is vaccination-and not hygiene-that we continue to regard as the most interventionist feature of state medicine. It is not hard to understand why. Vaccination involves forcible restraint and handling of the body; it may have perceptible physiological effect; and often a scar will remain. Before bacteriologists expanded their understanding of the role of the body in the transmission of disease organisms, vaccinators were the health officers most likely to track down and inspect local populations. Health departments were sending inspectors into schools to check on unvaccinated children long before they sought to detect children with communicable diseases. 5 So there are plausible phenomenological and historical reasons to view vaccination as an especially egregious state intervention. But in focusing on vaccination, we may miss other medical agitations of social life that are more productive and lasting, though less obvious.
If the target of vaccination-revealed in references to "herd immunity"-is primarily the social body, the goal of hygiene is reform of the individual body. One practice thus biologically regularizes a population; the other produces an individuation. 6 One is, in a sense, a technology of security; the other, a technology of drill. Vaccination therefore belongs to an older military model of the campaign, while hygiene follows a military logic of occupation (in effect, a missionary-military model, which Hubert Lyautey and other promoters of "small wars" doctrine were doing much to make popular at the turn of the nineteenth century). One is more-or-less repressive in its power; the other, more-or-less disciplinary. 7 But these distinctions are, of course, far too absolute, and perhaps of no more than heuristic value. I hope the rest of the article will complicate these dichotomies, reveal their mutual articulation, and so make them useful in understanding the ambiguous relationship between the state and mass vaccination programs.
VACCINATION IN THE COLONIAL PHILIPPINES
For most of the nineteenth century, smallpox was an exception in western disease theory; even in the early twentieth century, when in many ways it offered a model for explaining disease etiology and prevention, smallpox could still call forth unconventional responses. From the European Middle Ages, it was known that the disease was contagious-a disease of contact, not place-and that infection was followed by increased resisting power of the tissues. Smallpox, or variola, was mostly a disease of children, and appeared universal in its distribution. The history of its prevention through inoculation or variolation, and later by Jennerian vaccination, is well known. 8 Vaccination evidently worked on the principle that a mild case of disease protects an individual from further attacks. Smallpox was exceptional in that the material that excited this resistance was available; for other diseases, despite repeated efforts to invoke the same principles of immunity, no comparable material was found, though many claimed some success in using morbilization to prevent measles.
9 So smallpox seemed doubly extraordinary: first, as an indubitable contagion; second, as a disease that could be prevented through biological means. By the 1870s, most European nations enforced compulsory vaccination laws; in Germany, revaccination at twelve years also had been made compulsory, to prevent "varioloid," or smallpox of the vaccinated. 10 In colonial India, the British passed compulsory vaccination laws in 1880, but they proved difficult to enforce. response to occasional smallpox outbreaks. The central board of vaccination had been producing and distributing lymph since 1806; by 1898, there were 122 regular vacunadores working in the provinces and major towns. Even so, smallpox remained a serious and recurrent threat to public health in the islands under the Spanish. 13 Many Filipinos shunned the vaccinators, who were in any case often underpaid and disinclined to seek out the fainthearted. Moreover, the vaccine was often ineffective, or variably potent.
Later a target for American criticism, the Spanish colonial health system at the end of the nineteenth century was relatively modern in its aspirations, even if its achievements were insubstantial.
14 Provincial medical officers, the médicos titulares, had first been appointed in 1876; and the Superior Board of Health and Charity, equivalent to a public health department, was established in 1883 and expanded in 1888. Since 1877, Filipino medical doctors had been able to graduate from the University of Santo Tomás. An effective quarantine service was in place, and provision had been made for the isolation of those suffering from infectious diseases. Toward the end of the century, health authorities began to press into service the new knowledge of microbial causes of disease-but they were not far advanced in this endeavor, and their innovations would soon be undone by war. Nevertheless, in 1887 the government had created the Laboratorio Municipal de Manila in order to examine food, water, and clinical specimens. 15 During the Philippine-American war of 1898-1902, the Spanish health system broke down completely. As they advanced, American forces established in its place a new stratum of public health institutions, based directly on a military model. 16 The interim military board of health for Manila, organized in September 1898, developed the fundamental arrangements for sanitation and health care delivery in the city. It divided the city into ten districts and appointed a municipal physician to each. During this period, separate hospitals for smallpox, leprosy, and venereal diseases were established, and a veterinary corps was organized. In August 1899, the board added a bacteriological department to its municipal laboratory and set up a plague hospital. A municipal dispensary opened in late 1899. One of the principal achievements of this military board was its vaccination program. Although fortunate enough not to have to contend initially with cholera, the board did need to contain the smallpox that had become endemic in Manila. High temperatures had rendered inert the vaccine virus sent from the United States, so it was necessary to find a local source for the immunizing agent. One of the military board's first decisions was to reopen the old Spanish vaccine farm and standardize its production in horses and caribao. A corps of carefully supervised vaccinators soon roamed the streets: by the middle of 1899, they had "properly" vaccinated almost 80,000 people.
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The health ordinance promulgated on 6 April 1901 became the foundation of a new civil health organization: it was the basis of all subsequent ordinances and of the sanitary code. The ordinance was designed principally to control the spread of infectious disease among the islands' population. It provided, among other things, that a physician called to visit or examine any case of infectious or contagious disease should immediately isolate the patient and notify the health authorities by telephone or "postal card." The term "infectious or contagious disease" included smallpox; cholera; chicken pox; plague; diphtheria; ship or typhus fever; typhoid; spotted, relapsing, yellow, and scarlet fevers; measles; leprosy; and anthrax (but not the undoubtedly insect-borne diseases such as malaria or dengue).
18 Any building, locality, or ship infected by these diseases would be quarantined. The ordinance also regulated the selling of food by street vendors, the condition of tenements, and night soil collection. A system of sanitary inspectors-separate from the vaccinators-was organized to check for violations of the regulations. Manila was divided into ten districts-as it had been under the military boardwith an American medical officer, and subordinate Filipino inspectors, responsible for each division. Furthermore, the ordinance contained a compulsory vaccination clause, which made it the duty of everyone in Manila to be successfully vaccinated each year.
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Compulsory vaccination was later extended throughout the provinces, requiring everyone in the archipelago to present a certificate of vaccination signed by the president of the municipal board of health, a public vaccinator, or a qualified physician.
Victor G. Heiser, the director of the civil health service, was particularly proud of the rigor with which he enforced smallpox vaccination in the islands. The annual deaths from smallpox during the Philippine-American war were estimated at 40,000; yet in 1913, only 823 deaths were reported. 20 What, the health authorities asked, was responsible for "this almost unbelievable reduction"? Their answer, quite simply, was vaccination. The chief vaccinator under the Spanish regime had recorded 9,136 vaccinations in Manila between 3 November 1894 and 25 October 1898. In contrast, the American authorities-aware of the "necessity for constant vigilance in this disease" 21 -performed 103,931 vaccinations in 1899 alone, and almost 18 million by 1914.
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Even so, the coverage of these campaigns was generally more limited than their promoters admitted, with the exception, perhaps, of an unusually thorough general vaccination in 1905. Probably not more than half the vaccinations were successful. Smallpox remained endemic in the archipelago, its incidence increasing again by the 1920s.
23
Most Filipinos, mindful of the smallpox outbreak during the war, came voluntarily to the vaccinators, but the few who did not were tracked down. During the early vaccination programs, soldiers often accompanied the vaccinators. Sometimes Filipinos actively resisted their serological protectors. In Batangas in 1902, the teams would "enter first the most crowded houses and drive the inmates to the farthest room, then working at the doorway, natives are led out singly and each of any age not showing pock-marks, vaccinated."
24 But in the pacified areas, where vaccinators depended more on the cooperation of local officials, such military thoroughness was not often achieved. Even after repeated sweeps of the archipelago, it was still suspected that a low level of "smallpox infection apparently exists everywhere in the islands, and it will make its appearance in any community in which there are unvaccinated persons."
25 Control of the disease, then, warranted constant inspection of every town and barrio, along with recurrent mass vaccination-forced, if necessary. 26 But it was, an army medical officer recalled, "no small problem to sanitate eight millions of semi-civilized and savage people, inhabiting scores of islands with the aggregate area of a continent." 27 TOWARD A SANITARY IMMUNITY Mass vaccination against smallpox was evidently an important activity of American colonial health authorities in the Philippines. These campaigns, conducted with a military rigor, permitted the early registration of the population of the archipelago and its continuing surveillance. Smallpox vaccination was thus one of the first medical means of intervening in Philippine social life. Vaccination had symbolic importance, too. For Heiser and his successors, the control of contagious disease in the archipelago indicated the beneficence of American occupation: health officers were saving the Orient from itself, leading its people onto the path of science, progress, and health. The heroic smallpox vaccination campaigns therefore required an early expansion of the personnel of the health department; the sedimentation of health work over the whole archipelago; and reiteration of the need for efficient and scientific public health officers. Smallpox vaccination had been a good way of growing a health bureaucracy, but once grown, the organization dedicated itself to civic programs. In the early twentieth century, the enforcement of stipulations of personal and domestic hygiene was by far the major concern of the mature Philippines public health department. Heiser, for example, imagined himself "washing up the Orient," not just vaccinating it. Sanitary engineering, especially the provision of clean water, was not neglected, but Heiser and his colleagues generally regarded major public works as extravagant and impractical in such an impoverished colony. Disease prevention increasingly involved education and isolation, focusing on the regulation of social life as a means to control the transmission of newly identified microbial pathogens. But the "peculiar" and refractory social life of Filipinos supposedly complicated the sanitary officer's task. Heiser lamented the profusion of their "incurable habits." He cited as obstacles the "unsuitable dietary of the people, their peculiar superstitions concerning the contraction of the disease, their almost unshakable fear of night air as a poisonous thing, a fear which has kept their houses tightly closed at night for generations past, their habit of chewing betel nut which has made the custom of expectorating in public . . . universal." abolished, and then a gigantic anti-spitting crusade begun, and, last of all, comes the Herculean task of rousing them out of their inertia."
29 Health authorities reached out to those who had not yet contracted disease, to emphasize that "they live in constant danger of infection," and to point out that "the path of safety lies in the maintenance of good general health through the observance of simple rules of right living." 30 The major goal of the progressive colonial public health department was the reform of pathological social habits-not, primarily, vaccination, and rarely the improvement of environmental, economic, or industrial conditions.
In developing programs to modify Filipino customs and habitswhether through education or inspection-the Bureau of Health attempted to inculcate a distrust of the body and its products, a dread of personal contact, and a respect for American sanitary wisdom.
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Colonial authorities targeted toilet practices, food handling, dietary customs, and housing design; they rebuilt the markets, using the more hygienic concrete, and suppressed unsanitary fiestas; they assumed the power to examine Filipinos at random, and to disinfect, fumigate, and medicate at will. It was the hygienic state-more than the immunizing state-that sanctioned, as never before in the archipelago, a reformation of everyday life and personal knowledge. To engage in this enterprise during the first years of American occupation would have been futile: the new colonial authority was not yet organized for persuasion, and its emissaries were too few to develop a rigorous apparatus of inspection. Extension of American control over the archipelago, and the early diffusion of an advance force of vaccinators, soon permitted such intervention-which in itself would further ramify colonial authority.
The crusade for "cleanliness" sharpened social divisions (and legitimated social categories) in the Philippines, further separating colonized from colonizers, the sick from the healthy, native disease carriers from non-immune foreigners. Strict enforcement of the rules of personal and domestic hygiene promised multiple benefits: local populations, less manifestly unwell, would be able to work more efficiently; and, less likely to carry disease organisms, they would present fewer dangers to Europeans (whose own disease-carrying capacity generally was ignored). Tropical public health was principally a localized form of industrial hygiene, first for the colonizer, and then for the laboring colonized. And clearly the policy of education and supervision had other advantages. Its goal of nurturing self-control among Filipinos offered both to absolve the authorities from major environmental and social reform-so promising the great financial savings never far from a colonial administrator's thoughts-and to accord in the most progressive style with the new science of disease causation, transmission, and acquisition.
Elsewhere, I have linked the increasing emphasis on hygiene in colonial medicine to the changing character of colonial warfare, choosing to emphasize new styles of military deployment and management more than innovation in laboratory practice.
32 Germ theory was a resource for new medical strategies, not their cause. A public health system modeled on colonial warfare is considerably different from any derived from notions of continental warfare: colonial wars are fought in remote countries over large areas of unknown territory with the aim not the destruction of the enemy, but, as Jean Gottman has pointed out, the "organization of the conquered peoples and territory under a particular control." 33 The aim is to occupy and organize subjugated territories. In 1900, Hubert Lyautey announced a new principle of colonial strategy: avoid the column and replace it with "progressive occupation." (In fact, this was a codification of what had already emerged in practice.) "Military occupation," he wrote, "consists less in military operations than in an organization on the march." The idea was to cover new territory with a network of disciplinary structures, including a network of hygiene. Colonial warfare at the turn of the century was recognized as inseparable from administration. According to Lyautey, "the occupation deposits the units in the soil like sedimentary strata"-it creates a new, more favorable, terrain. 34 As a historian of colonial warfare has commented, "instead of bringing death to the theater of operations, the aim [was] to create life within it." 35 In the early twentieth century, hygiene thus moves out of the enclave or garrison, and becomes an operational constituent of the military management of colonial populations, a specified part of the new strategy of colonial warfare. It is within this administrative structure-a colonial amalgam of medicine and the military-that bacteriology and parasitology eventually are recognized as useful tools. In relation to vaccination, then, my point is this: it resembles an older continental military operation-a remnant embedded in modern health strategy-while the new hygiene, as an "organization on the march," does more to create a favorable terrain for the colonial state. Each follows a different military model, with different consequences.
It is as easy to overstate this emerging concern with hygiene as it has been to ignore it. Development of vaccines was, of course, as much a part of the new bacteriology as was the prevention of disease transmission through reform of personal conduct. Louis Pasteur, assuming that cowpox was an attenuated form of smallpox (even though he could isolate no microbe), had developed the principles of active immunization with living, attenuated cultures. He experimented with immunization against anthrax and rabies, using infective material of lowered virulence: even when attenuated, this material appeared to retain the property of antigenicity. When Pasteur, in 1881, managed to produce immunity to anthrax in sheep, he called the non-virulent antigenic material a "vaccine," in honor of Jenner. In 1896, Almroth Wright produced active immunity to typhoid with a killed bacterial vaccine. Trials on 4,000 volunteers in the Indian army between 1898 and 1902, using broth cultures of bacilli killed by exposure to high temperatures and 0.4% Lysol, gave encouraging results but also severe local and general reactions. By the end of the nineteenth century, it was evident that the injection of germs in an attenuated state, or when dead, could confer a resistance to many communicable diseases. The list of candidate vaccines might be expanded indefinitely. In 1896, Wilhelm Kolle had prepared a heat-killed cholera vaccine that gained some epidemiological support but was not widely taken up. The next year, in India, Waldemar Haffkine developed a plague vaccine, using a broth culture of the organism (isolated by Yersin and Kitasato in 1894), heat-killed and phenolized. Within a few weeks, over 8,000 people were inoculated in Bombay; millions of doses were later produced in the Plague Research Laboratory. During 1902-1903, over half the military in the Punjab was vaccinated against plague, with an apparent reduction in case incidence and mortality. (But the Mulkowal disaster, in 1902, when tetanus contamination killed nineteen recipients, helped to mute enthusiasm for plague vaccination.) During this period, laboratory researchers also were adding a variety of antitoxins-most significantly, against diphtheria and tetanus-to these expanding serological resources.
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A large variety of sera and vaccines were developed and kept in stock in the serum laboratory of the Bureau of Science in the Philippines. In the laboratory's early years, the preparation of anti-rinderpest serum and of smallpox vaccine constituted the bulk of its work, but it also issued diphtheria, plague, and tetanus antitoxins.
38 By 1909, it was offering tuberculin; vaccines for cholera, anthrax, gonococcus, and Staph. aureus and S. albus; and sera for diphtheria, cholera, typhoid, plague, and dysentery. 39 In 1913, anti-meningococcic serum was added to the list. Even carcinoma tissue from Filipino patients in the wards of the Philippines General Hospital was dried and pulverized at the serum laboratories to produce a vaccine against carcinoma. 40 Of course most of these products were experimental; their profusion indicates more an enthusiasm for the potential of the new serology than any confidence in its current efficacy. But all the same, a few products were clearly effective. By 1918, the serum laboratory was producing annually enough vaccine virus to effectively vaccinate two million people against smallpox. 41 Serum development-fundamentally a service role-also provided opportunities for creditable "original investigation." Indeed, Paul Freer, the director of the Bureau of Science, noted that "in the Serum Laboratory as in any other the value of the research work is apparent. The last word on the manufacture of serums and prophylactics has not by any means been rendered."
42 And yet, he continued, "so much of the time of the force is taken by the actual care of the animals and in making serums for which at present there is a demand," that many worthwhile projects had been put aside. The staff nevertheless found time to experiment with using glycerine in the preparation of vaccine virus; 43 Rüdiger investigated the etiology of rinderpest; 44 and a vast array of immunological agents continued to be developed and tested in this period. 45 The most notable local innovation was Richard P. Strong's production of a more effective cholera vaccine. 46 In 1918, sera and vaccines were displayed at the Asamblea Regional de Médicos y Farmaceúticos to teach Filipino physicians how to obtain and use a variety of immunological agents.
Photographs on display there showed the serum stables, bleeding house, and the process of obtaining blood from horses to make sera and vaccines. (Many physicians later visited the Bureau itself, where they were entertained by J. A. Johnston's demonstration of the motility of cholera vibrios, "showing the scintillating, darting movements" of the organisms. 47 ) Clinical trials of the new immunological products at Bilibid Prison were common in the first decade of the century. Early in September 1905, for instance, one-half of the prisoners received cholera vaccine: the resultant "herd immunity" seemed to reduce the spread of the disease. 48 But perhaps the most memorable-and infamous-of these studies was Strong's inoculation of twenty-four inmates with a new live cholera vaccine that had somehow become contaminated with plague organisms. 49 A virulent plague culture had been accidentally mixed with the cholera cultures. All the men sickened, and thirteen died. After an investigation, Strong was exonerated. Strong had, though, conducted the inoculations "in the convalescent ward [where] he ordered all the prisoners there to form a line . . . without telling them what he was going to do, nor consulting their wishes in the matter." 50 Neither cholera nor plague was prevalent in the prison at the time. The investigating committee suggested that Strong had forgotten "the respect due every human being in not having asked the consent of persons inoculated." It enjoined the governor-general to order that no one would be subjected to "experiment without prior determination of the character of that experiment by authorities . . . nor without having first gained the expressed consent of the person subject to it." 51 Clearly vaccine development could be a creditable, if risky, field of investigation even in a state increasingly dedicated to hygiene reform. But the new candidate vaccines were used primarily in the military in the Philippines; even the expatriate American community was allowed no automatic biological protection from local diseases.
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No one proposed any additional mass vaccination campaign; the response to outbreaks of plague, typhoid, and cholera did not include vaccination of Filipinos. Freer extolled experiments based on the theory that "a natural immunity may be increased or one which is scarcely existent may be rendered apparent and protective by the introduction of cells, or the products of these cells."
53 But the actual use of vaccines remained limited. Whether for technical, financial, or governmental reasons, the health authorities continued to rely on stipulations of personal hygiene to control the transmission of pathogens, rather than deliver an automatic immunological protection that might render such rules of proper conduct medically unnecessary. Until the 1920s, smallpox vaccination was the only large-scale program of biological protection for civilians in the archipelago.
CONCLUSION
The medical response to smallpox remained exceptional even when it had become, in theory at least, paradigmatic. There are a number of reasons for this singularity. Smallpox vaccine was cheaper than most others, and, since the introduction of glycerinated lymph in the 1890s, often more reliable. Its use was hallowed by long tradition. And smallpox itself was a notoriously contagious disease, not likely to be contained by even the most stringent of hygienic stipulations. Just as importantly, smallpox vaccination had become an effective means of building up a public health bureaucracy: Judith W. Leavitt has observed that in the United States, too, the effect of a smallpox outbreak was "typically to increase the power and effectiveness of the health department." 54 In his study of state vaccination in Victorian Britain, R. J. Lambert argues that "technocrats," not politicians or the public, used compulsory vaccination to construct a "medical department of state." 55 Although mass vaccination became the symbol of an interventionist and repressive state, it more accurately indicated the state's sensitivity to pressure from the medical profession or public health bureaucrats. But in the early twentieth century, vaccination fitted uneasily with a governmental discourse increasingly committed to socialization. State support for vaccination programs became more ambiguous. Smallpox prevention allowed a government to reach, but not to grasp, the people: once it had reached them, it would have them acquire a form of civility, not antibodies. Hygiene, not vaccination, thus became the watchword of health departments everywhere. 56 In 1978 at Alma Ata, representatives of the member states of the World Health Organization declared their support for primary health care-indicating a concern to target health education and provision at the level previously occupied by hygiene alone. In particular, the conference emphasized the need for education concerning health problems, promotion of proper nutrition and safe water supplies, maternal and child health care, prevention and control of local endemic disease, and the provision of essential drugs. Immunization against major infectious diseases, previously approached "vertically" as single-focus projects aimed at a specific disease, was to become enmeshed in the delivery of general primary health care. 57 But many international health experts regarded such a comprehensive program as impractical and too expensive: they promoted instead a more selective strategy, which underpinned the later universal child immunization program and specific disease eradication goals. 58 The tension between such "vertical" and "horizontal" programs, too often rendered simply as a struggle between opposites, has generated considerable controversy among international health experts; it has also echoed, if faintly, many of the earlier divergences in the approaches of vaccinologists and hygienists. Debabar Banerji, for example, argues that the focus on immunization in selective primary health care perpetuates the "short-term technocentric approaches" that characterized the mass BCG campaign and the malaria and smallpox eradication programs. In contrast, through comprehensive primary health care, "the entire edifice of the health services might be built with a mix of technology and administrative structure, tailor-made to serve the interests of the people." 59 On the other hand, Peter Wright provocatively advocates a technical approach that does not become complicated by educational efforts: although the smallpox eradication program often resembled an old-fashioned military campaign, it did work (and it did expand the international health services). He praises immunization, for it is "a vehicle that runs independently of social customs and is a means to improve health without being a mechanism for social change." 60 In other words, the more effectively vaccination intervenes, the less useful it is as a vehicle for social discipline. But perhaps the response to AIDS provides the best illustration. Wright laments that the prevention of HIV transmission currently depends on an "individualized educational component and understanding of cultures" in order to change the "basic structures of social (and sexual) intercourse." 61 A vaccine, to some extent, would make such social reform unnecessary, but would its use, however "coercive," promote the interests of a modern state dedicated to the colonization of the bodies of its citizens? Probably not so effectively as current stipulations of sexual and social hygiene, delivered at the level of primary health care.
"The modern state," Paul Greenough writes, "is in a position to demand that its citizens surrender their immune systems as a public duty."
62 But such a submission is among the less exacting demands that a modern state can make. 
